Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s arrival in Belgrade carried an unusual piece of political choreography. When the Ukrainian president landed at Nikola Tesla airport on August 7, he was met not by President Aleksandar Vučić or Prime Minister Đuro Macut, but by Dubravka Đedović Handanović, Serbia’s minister of mining and energy. In a relationship usually examined through the lenses of Russia, Kosovo and Serbian ammunition reaching the Ukrainian battlefield, the choice immediately raised a different question: was Belgrade signalling that electricity and energy security have become a second, less politically explosive pillar of Serbian-Ukrainian relations?
The trade figures suggest that this interpretation is more than speculation. During the first six months of 2026, Serbia exported about $57.8mn of electricity to Ukraine, equivalent to roughly 31 per cent of all Serbian goods exports to the country. Electricity had barely figured among Serbia’s leading exports to Ukraine a year earlier. The transformation has been rapid enough to make power one of the most important measurable commercial links between the two countries.
That does not mean the airport reception proves that electricity was the principal subject of Zelenskyy’s visit. No Serbian official has publicly said that Đedović Handanović was selected for that reason, and ceremonial decisions in Belgrade can have several political explanations. But the economic background makes the choice considerably less mysterious. Energy was repeatedly raised during Zelenskyy’s meetings with both Vučić and Macut, while Serbia has already supplied Ukraine with energy equipment and committed further financial support to its damaged power system.
The official programme confirms that energy was not a peripheral subject. Serbian and Ukrainian officials discussed energy cooperation, infrastructure, reconstruction, trade and European integration, while Zelenskyy specifically addressed the damage inflicted on Ukraine’s thermal power plants and the preparations required for another difficult winter. Serbia also committed €2mn to supporting the Ukrainian energy sector, on top of earlier assistance involving equipment including high-voltage transformers and mobile generators supplied as part of efforts to restore damaged infrastructure.
The commercial relationship is moving in the same direction. Serbian government figures put bilateral goods trade in the first half of the year at roughly $321mn, following approximately $450mn in 2025. Serbian exports are growing markedly faster than imports, with electricity, fertilizers and tyres becoming leading categories. A bilateral free-trade agreement, negotiations for which have been revived after years of limited progress, could give this trade another structural push.
Electricity is particularly important because its emergence is being driven by circumstances on both sides of the transaction.
Ukraine needs power because Russia’s continuing attacks have repeatedly damaged generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure. Electricity imports have consequently become part of the country’s security architecture rather than simply another commodity trade. Ukraine is connected to continental Europe’s synchronous electricity system and can draw supply through neighbouring markets when domestic generation is insufficient.
Serbia, meanwhile, has acquired a strong commercial incentive to search for markets outside the European Union.
Since the definitive phase of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism entered into force on January 1, 2026, electricity generated in carbon-intensive Western Balkan systems has become substantially more expensive to sell into EU markets. Serbia’s generation mix still contains a large share of lignite-fired power, which means the carbon adjustment can significantly reduce the economics of exporting electricity directly into EU member states.
The Energy Community Secretariat has already identified a change in regional trading patterns. During the second quarter, electricity increasingly moved northwards through Serbia towards the Hungarian border, while Ukraine appeared to be emerging as a potentially important destination for surplus Western Balkan power. Commercial flows from Serbia towards Hungary increased sharply compared with the same period last year. The shift does not mean that every megawatt-hour scheduled commercially from Serbia can be physically traced to a Ukrainian consumer — electricity moves through an interconnected European network — but it shows how Ukrainian demand is beginning to reshape the economics of south-east European electricity trading.
The numbers already visible in Serbian trade statistics are striking. In the first quarter alone Serbia exported $32.2mn of electricity to Ukraine, representing 34 per cent of its exports to the country. By the end of the first half, electricity exports had reached $57.8mn. For comparison, electricity was not even among Serbia’s five largest exports to Ukraine in 2025.
There is therefore a straightforward commercial explanation for the developing relationship. Ukraine needs energy; Serbia periodically has exportable electricity; CBAM has made some traditional EU destinations less attractive; and the Hungarian corridor provides a route towards a large electricity-deficit market.
This makes energy politically useful to Vučić as well.
Serbia can present electricity exports and grid assistance as commercial and humanitarian cooperation rather than military alignment with Kyiv. That distinction matters enormously in Belgrade. Serbia continues to refuse sanctions against Russia, maintains substantial political and economic relationships with Moscow and remains dependent on Russian gas. At the same time, it formally supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and is trying to demonstrate to Brussels and Washington that its relationship with Russia does not prevent practical assistance to Kyiv.
Electricity sits almost perfectly inside that balancing strategy.
Selling megawatt-hours is easier to defend domestically than supplying artillery rounds. Power exports generate income for Serbia, support Ukraine’s civilian economy and can be justified through ordinary regional electricity trading. Transformers, generators and reconstruction projects can similarly be described as humanitarian infrastructure assistance. None requires Vučić to announce a formal strategic alignment with Ukraine.
Ammunition is much more complicated.
Serbia has one of the most significant defence industries in the Balkans and retains production capacity for Soviet-standard ammunition that remains particularly useful to Ukrainian forces. Serbian-made ammunition has reached Ukraine for years through third countries, even though Belgrade maintains that it does not directly supply either party to the conflict. An earlier Financial Times estimate placed the value of Serbian ammunition ultimately reaching Ukraine through intermediaries at around €800mn during the early years of the full-scale war, a figure Vučić indicated was broadly plausible.
The issue has repeatedly caused friction with Moscow. Russia has accused Serbia of allowing ammunition to reach Ukraine through countries including the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Belgrade tightened export controls after Russian pressure, while continuing to insist that Serbian defence companies need access to international customers and that Serbia cannot completely control what foreign buyers eventually do with legally exported ammunition.
This makes the military element of Zelenskyy’s Belgrade visit simultaneously important and difficult to document.
Vučić publicly said that military cooperation was not discussed during the official talks. That statement should be taken seriously when describing the declared agenda. At the same time, the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies has argued that maintaining access to Serbian ammunition — particularly scarce 122mm and 152mm Soviet-standard artillery rounds — was likely among Kyiv’s most important underlying interests in the visit. That remains an analytical assessment rather than a disclosed agreement between the two governments.
The distinction is crucial. Ammunition may remain strategically more valuable to Ukraine than Serbian electricity in battlefield terms, but electricity is becoming the more transparent and institutionally expandable part of the bilateral relationship.
And unlike ammunition deliveries, the energy relationship has considerable room to grow after the war.
Serbia and Ukraine are discussing infrastructure and reconstruction projects, with Belgrade expressing willingness to participate in rebuilding one of the Ukrainian cities severely affected by the conflict. A free-trade agreement could eventually improve access for Serbian engineering companies, construction groups, electrical equipment manufacturers, agricultural suppliers and logistics operators. Ukraine’s reconstruction needs will extend far beyond generation plants to substations, transformers, transmission lines, railway electricity systems, district heating and municipal infrastructure.
For Serbia, that creates a potential commercial bridge into what is likely to become one of Europe’s largest reconstruction programmes.
Energy cooperation could also extend beyond simply selling Serbian electricity. Ukraine possesses major underground gas-storage infrastructure close to its western borders, while Serbia is trying to diversify a gas system still heavily connected to Russia. Belgrade is simultaneously expanding interconnections towards Bulgaria, Romania and North Macedonia and positioning itself within emerging north-south gas and electricity corridors across south-east Europe.
No Serbian-Ukrainian gas-storage agreement was announced during Zelenskyy’s visit, so such cooperation remains prospective rather than established. Yet the strategic logic is visible. A regional energy architecture connecting Greece and the Balkans through Romania, Hungary, Moldova and Ukraine would give Serbia more options for sourcing, moving and potentially storing gas outside its traditional Russian supply structure.
This is also what makes Đedović Handanović an unusually appropriate figure to receive Zelenskyy.
The Serbian energy minister operates at the intersection of nearly all the country’s competing geopolitical relationships. Her ministry manages Serbia’s continuing energy relationship with Russia, negotiations surrounding the Russian-linked oil company NIS, closer energy cooperation with the US, major infrastructure relationships with the EU and large energy projects involving European, Chinese and other international partners. Before entering government she headed the European Investment Bank’s regional representation for the Western Balkans.
Putting her at the airport therefore sent a more nuanced signal than simply assigning a cabinet minister to ceremonial duty. Serbia was not presenting Zelenskyy with its defence establishment. Nor was it demonstrating a wholesale geopolitical break with Russia. It was presenting the part of the government capable of building a substantial, commercially defensible relationship with Ukraine without formally abandoning Serbia’s carefully maintained neutrality.
The economic incentives reinforce that approach.
Serbia’s electricity industry is entering a period in which cross-border market access is becoming more complicated. The Energy Community has estimated substantial implicit CBAM costs for Serbian electricity entering the EU under default carbon-intensity assumptions. That makes alternative customers increasingly valuable, particularly during periods when Serbia has surplus production from hydroelectric plants, coal units and expanding renewable capacity.
Ukraine offers unusually deep demand.
War damage has reduced the reliability of its domestic power system, while every additional winter increases the value of secure import capacity. The country is also unlikely to stop needing electricity investment immediately after hostilities end. Rebuilding destroyed generating assets, replacing transformers, strengthening interconnections and decentralising generation will require years of capital expenditure.
Serbia therefore has a possible market in Ukraine that stretches from short-term electricity trading to long-term equipment supply and infrastructure contracting.
That relationship will remain constrained by Serbia’s own system. EPS cannot export electricity indefinitely regardless of domestic conditions. Serbian output remains sensitive to hydrology, coal production, plant availability and domestic consumption. A poor hydrological year or outages at major thermal plants could quickly transform Serbia from exporter into importer. Electricity sales to Ukraine should therefore be viewed as an emerging commercial corridor rather than a guaranteed long-term baseload supply commitment.
The political value nevertheless remains considerable.
For Kyiv, Serbia provides ammunition, commercial goods, electricity, humanitarian equipment and potentially reconstruction capacity while remaining one of Moscow’s traditional European partners. Every additional area of cooperation weakens the idea that Russia can determine Serbia’s external relationships.
For Belgrade, Ukraine provides something equally useful. Cooperation with Kyiv allows Vučić to demonstrate practical alignment with important western objectives without joining sanctions against Russia. Ukraine’s continued refusal to recognise Kosovo also gives Serbia a diplomatic argument for maintaining cordial relations with Kyiv despite domestic pro-Russian sentiment.
That combination explains the apparently contradictory imagery of the visit. A Serbian government that still speaks of maintaining dependable energy relations with Moscow can simultaneously supply electricity and energy equipment to Ukraine. A country that denies directly arming Kyiv can operate a defence industry whose ammunition reaches Ukrainian forces through western customers. A government criticised in Brussels for insufficient foreign-policy alignment can point to expanding Ukrainian trade, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction commitments.
The airport reception becomes more revealing when seen against those economic flows.
Ammunition remains the most geopolitically sensitive Serbian contribution to Ukraine and may still be the commodity Kyiv values most strategically. But electricity has become the fastest-emerging official pillar of the relationship. $57.8mn of power exports in six months, a 31 per cent share of Serbian exports to Ukraine, €2mn of additional Serbian energy support, transformer and generator deliveries, reconstruction discussions and a changing regional electricity market together provide a strong explanation for why Serbia’s energy minister occupied such a visible position during Zelenskyy’s arrival.
What appeared at first to be an odd piece of diplomatic protocol increasingly looks like a map of where Serbia-Ukraine relations are heading: ammunition remains largely in the shadows, while electricity, infrastructure and reconstruction are moving into the open.
