Energy security or energy dependence? Serbia’s long-term strategy under scrutiny

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For more than three decades, Serbia has walked a narrow path between energy independence and energy vulnerability. Its system, historically built on domestic lignite and large hydropower, has been both a source of resilience and a trap that limits flexibility and adaptability. Today, as Europe undergoes the fastest energy transition in its history and as regional supply dynamics shift unpredictably, Serbia’s long-term strategy faces renewed scrutiny. The question is no longer whether Serbia will change its energy model, but whether it has already waited too long to do so.

Energy security is no longer defined solely by access to fuel or the ability to generate electricity within national borders. In the twenty-first century, energy security is a multidimensional concept: diversification of energy sources, integration with regional markets, infrastructure resilience, storage capability, renewable penetration, digitalisation, and the ability to withstand geopolitical shocks. Serbia must now confront an uncomfortable truth: while its traditional model ensured stability in the past, it increasingly exposes the country to new forms of risk.

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We explore the critical tensions shaping Serbia’s long-term energy strategy: the decline of coal as a pillar of independence, the slow uptake of renewables, the growing dependence on electricity imports, the geopolitical implications of gas contracts, the fragility of ageing infrastructure, and the strategic choices Serbia must make if it wants to avoid entering a decade of systemic vulnerability.

The balance between energy security and energy dependence is becoming thinner with each passing year. Whether Serbia will strengthen one or drift into the other depends on decisions made — or avoided — today.

Serbia’s inherited energy model: independence with hidden fragilities

For decades, Serbia’s energy model rested on three foundations: lignite, hydropower, and an insulated market dominated by state-owned enterprises. Lignite provided cheap, domestically available energy, freeing Serbia from dependence on foreign fuel. Hydropower offered seasonal balance and flexibility. EPS, as the vertically integrated utility, played the role of both protector and shock absorber.

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This model created a sense of independence. Serbia rarely worried about external supply, geopolitical risk or market volatility. In times of regional disruption, Serbia was often insulated, relying on internal production rather than imports.

But this model had structural weaknesses that became visible only when external conditions changed and internal capacity weakened.

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Lignite, while cheap and abundant, is low in calorific value, high in pollutants, and requires continuous reinvestment to remain reliable. Mines are labour-intensive and prone to geological instability. Power plants are old, inefficient and increasingly costly to maintain. Hydropower, though clean, is vulnerable to climate variability. The dominance of EPS created a system resistant to innovation, decentralisation and private investment.

For years these weaknesses were masked by stable demand, controlled prices, predictable weather patterns and minimal external shocks. But the world has changed faster than Serbia’s energy system.

The rise of electricity imports: when “independence” becomes an illusion

One of the most telling indicators of Serbia’s energy vulnerability is the growing reliance on electricity imports during winter peaks, drought seasons or unexpected outages. Imports were once a seasonal balancing tool. Today, they have become a structural feature of the system.

This trend exposes several strategic issues.

First, thermal plants do not produce as much reliable power as they used to. Ageing units break down more often. Coal production fails to meet planned volumes. Mines suffer from landslides, equipment shortages and underinvestment. When thermal output drops, the system must fill the gap with imports, regardless of price.

Second, hydropower is unpredictable. Dry years significantly reduce output. Climate volatility has replaced the once reliable seasonal rhythm of Serbia’s rivers. Without storage capacity or fast-acting reserves, Serbia must buy electricity on the market whenever hydropower falls.

Third, domestic renewables are not expanding fast enough to offset the decline of old systems. Solar and wind still contribute a small fraction of Serbia’s total generation, leaving the country exposed during peak demand.

The consequence is clear: Serbia, once considered energy independent, increasingly depends on external markets that are volatile, expensive and influenced by geopolitical factors. Each winter brings uncertainty that did not exist in previous decades. Energy independence is not merely a matter of domestic resources; it is a matter of system performance.

Gas dependency: a strategic vulnerability hiding behind stable contracts

Electricity is only one part of the picture. Gas is the other — and it represents one of Serbia’s most significant strategic vulnerabilities.

Many industries in Serbia depend on natural gas. Heating systems in urban centres rely on gas. Power plants use gas for balancing generation. And while Serbia has alternative pipelines and the ability to import via interconnectors, the country’s gas supply is still dominated by long-term arrangements with a single geopolitical partner.

This concentration poses four risks.

The first risk is price volatility. When global markets fluctuate, Serbia cannot fully escape their effects, even with favourable bilateral agreements.

The second is supply interruption. Although unlikely in stable conditions, it becomes a major concern during geopolitical tensions.

The third is infrastructure bottlenecks. Serbia needs more interconnectors, more storage, and more diversification routes. The Balkan region is rapidly integrating new gas corridors, and Serbia must keep pace or risk being left out of diversified flows.

The fourth is the decarbonisation dilemma. As Europe phases out fossil fuels and imposes stricter carbon rules, Serbia must plan now for a future where gas may not be the reliable, affordable option it once was.

Dependency is not only about the supplier. It is about the absence of alternatives.

Renewable energy: Serbia’s opportunity to regain control

Renewables represent Serbia’s best opportunity to rebuild energy security. Solar and wind can drastically reduce import needs, diversify supply, strengthen resilience and unlock regional trade advantages. But Serbia’s renewable expansion moves too slowly to change its security position in the short term.

Investors want to build. Global developers see Serbia as an attractive market. Domestic conglomerates are entering renewables. Banks have liquidity ready for green projects. Technology is affordable. The region demands more clean energy.

The only obstacle is the system’s speed.

Permitting is slow. Grid access is difficult. Auctions are irregular. Administrative coordination is weak. EPS’s role in the renewable transition is unclear. Municipalities lack capacity. And inter-agency responsibilities overlap.

Renewables can transform Serbia’s energy landscape, but regulatory delay keeps the country tied to old dependencies.

Infrastructure ageing: the silent threat that grows each year

Beyond generation, Serbia faces another strategic challenge: infrastructure ageing. Transmission lines, substations, transformers and distribution grids were built in an era with different demands, different technologies and different consumption patterns.

Some parts of the system are overstretched. Others lack digitalisation. Storage is limited. Maintenance costs are rising. System flexibility is inadequate. Grid reinforcement needs are significant.

Without modern infrastructure, Serbia cannot integrate large amounts of renewables, cannot reduce curtailment, cannot optimise imports and cannot support industrial expansion.

Energy security in the twenty-first century is not about fuel reserves. It is about infrastructure resilience and system flexibility.

Regional integration: Serbia’s unrealised opportunity

Serbia sits in a strategic location with interconnections to all neighbouring countries. In theory, this should position Serbia as a regional energy hub. But in practice, the lack of harmonisation, insufficient market coupling, and slow regulatory alignment limit Serbia’s ability to fully benefit.

The region is moving toward a more interconnected and dynamic electricity market. Albania and North Macedonia have established energy partnerships. Croatia and Slovenia are deep into EU market coupling. Greece is becoming a major regional exporter. Romania and Bulgaria are accelerating renewable expansion.

Serbia can play a leading role — but only if it accelerates market liberalisation, modernises its grid, and aligns more closely with EU energy frameworks.

Regional integration is not optional. It is an essential tool of energy security.

Decarbonisation as a security strategy, not an environmental policy

Many in Serbia still frame decarbonisation as an external obligation — a European requirement, a bureaucratic burden, a cost. But decarbonisation is fundamentally a security strategy.

  • Increasing renewables reduces reliance on imports.
  • Improving efficiency reduces total demand.
  • Developing storage increases system stability.
  • Modernising the grid reduces outage risk.
  • Phasing out old lignite reduces maintenance crises.
  • Aligning with EU rules ensures competitiveness.
  • Lower emissions reduce future CBAM penalties.
  • Diversified energy systems are harder to break.

Energy security and decarbonisation are not separate goals. They are the same goal seen from two different angles.

The role of EPS: obstacle, necessity, or future leader?

EPS plays a decisive role in whether Serbia becomes secure or dependent. But EPS itself is undergoing an identity crisis. The company is overburdened with legacy assets, under pressure from political decision-making, and behind schedule on investments. Mines are unstable. Thermal plants need massive reconstruction. Hydropower needs modernisation. And renewables remain a small fraction of EPS’s portfolio.

EPS can be a vehicle of Serbia’s security — but only if it transforms. A modern EPS must become:

• financially stable
• operationally autonomous
• strategically transparent
• technologically advanced
• focused on renewables
• capable of partnering with private investors
• integrated into regional markets

If EPS continues to function as a politically steered, slow-moving utility, Serbia’s long-term strategy will remain stuck between outdated systems and future obligations.

A country cannot be energy secure if its primary utility is not strategically credible.

The risks of inaction

If Serbia continues its current trajectory, the risks compound.

Risk 1: Increased import dependence

Imports will become not an exception, but a structural necessity, especially during winter.

Risk 2: Rising costs

Imported electricity will strain public finances, industrial competitiveness and household budgets.

Risk 3: Grid instability

Without upgrades, Serbia risks outages, curtailment, or unplanned shutdowns.

Risk 4: Investor withdrawal

If delays persist, investors will move capital to countries with clearer processes.

Risk 5: Loss of industrial competitiveness

Energy-intensive industries may scale back or relocate.

Risk 6: Geopolitical exposure

Overreliance on specific fuel sources or partners increases vulnerability.

Risk 7: CBAM penalties

Exports to the EU may become costlier, undermining Serbian industry.

Risk 8: Employment loss in mining regions without a transition plan

A slow transition is more dangerous than a fast one, because it offers no certainty.

Energy dependence grows quietly. It becomes visible only when a shock arrives.
At that point, it is too late.

The alternative: a secure, modernised, diversified Serbian energy system

Serbia can be energy secure again, but only through decisive action. The foundations of a secure future already exist: strong renewable potential, strategic location, industrial demand, investor interest, and developing infrastructure.

A secure Serbian energy system must include:

• at least several gigawatts of new renewables
• grid modernisation and digitalisation
• large-scale storage solutions
• diversified gas supply
• strengthened interconnectors
• stable auction cycles
• transparent permitting
• clear long-term planning
• efficient collaboration between EPS, EMS and private sector
• alignment with EU rules and carbon markets

This transformation is not easy. But it is necessary. And the cost of transformation is far lower than the cost of inaction.

Serbia’s long-term strategy: clarity or contradiction?

Serbia’s official strategies — the energy strategy, the NECP, the national RES plan — all point in the right direction. The problem is implementation.

A strategy that takes too long to execute becomes a contradiction, not a roadmap.

Serbia’s long-term plan must be reshaped around realistic timelines, firm political will, market liberalisation, and institutional coherence. Otherwise, the strategy will remain an aspirational document disconnected from actual system performance.

Energy security must be treated as a national priority, not a policy chapter. Energy dependence must be treated as a national risk, not an inconvenience.

A decisive decade ahead

The next decade will determine Serbia’s energy position for the next fifty years. This period will bring more volatility, more weather extremes, more geopolitical shocks, faster technological progress and tighter EU regulation. Countries that act now will secure industrial growth, investor confidence and lower long-term energy costs. Countries that delay will face rising vulnerability.

Serbia has the potential to emerge as a stable, modern, flexible energy system — but it must confront the contradictions of its current model and the delay embedded in its institutions.

Energy independence is no longer a product of domestic mineral resources. It is a product of speed, adaptability, diversification and strategic clarity.

  • The choice Serbia faces is simple:
  • transform or drift.
  • lead or lag.
  • secure its future or become dependent on forces beyond its control.

The world is moving quickly. Serbia must decide whether it will move with it — or be carried along by it.

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