The Middle East energy shock has not only affected oil prices. It has changed the way energy investment is being assessed across the world. MAT records that global capital flows into the energy sector are expected to reach $3.4tn in 2026, up 5% from 2025. Around $2.2tn is expected to go into renewables, nuclear energy, power grids, storage, low-emission fuels, energy efficiency and electrification, while around $1.2tn is expected to be invested in oil, gas and coal. This split captures the new investment reality: security of supply and decarbonisation are no longer separate agendas.
The shock is global, but its effects are asymmetric. MAT describes the current Middle East conflict as a broad supply-side shock affecting not only oil and gas, but also LNG, fertilisers, sulphur, helium and aluminium. That makes it different from older oil shocks. The pressure runs into agriculture, manufacturing, construction and advanced technologies, not only fuel markets. Brent prices rose sharply during the conflict period, European gas prices moved higher, Asian LNG prices jumped, and financial markets responded through equities and bond yields.
For Southeast Europe, the lesson is immediate. Energy systems are now being judged by their resilience, not only by their lowest-cost generation source. Countries with import dependence, weak storage, limited interconnections, fragile hydrology or insufficient balancing capacity face a higher strategic risk premium. In this environment, grids and storage become investable infrastructure classes, not technical afterthoughts. A solar or wind project without grid capacity, forecasting, balancing and curtailment analysis is no longer a complete energy investment case.
The Strait of Hormuz dimension reinforces that logic. MAT notes that confidence in reliable transit through Hormuz has been seriously damaged and may remain fragile even after the immediate conflict is resolved. It also records that more than 30 energy facilities in the Middle East suffered moderate or serious damage, including refineries, petrochemical facilities, oil and gas production locations and parts of the Ras Laffan LNG Complex, while more than 20 tankers were hit during missile and drone attacks. Reconstruction costs are expected to reach tens of billions of dollars.
That matters for capital allocation beyond the Middle East. Reconstruction needs in the region can absorb capital that might otherwise have flowed into infrastructure and energy projects elsewhere. At the same time, importers will need to finance strategic reserves, storage capacity, alternative supply routes and domestic flexibility assets. For Serbia and SEE, this creates a sharper investment case for batteries, pumped hydro assessment, cross-border capacity, grid automation, gas storage optionality and renewable projects tied to industrial offtake.
The strongest investment signal is not that fossil fuels are disappearing. MAT notes that oil-supply investment is expected to decline for a third consecutive year, to below $500bn in 2026, even though producer revenues have risen with higher prices. This paradox points to uncertainty, long investment cycles, infrastructure bottlenecks and more cautious portfolio strategy.
The post-shock energy market rewards systems that can absorb volatility. For Serbia, that means the bankable energy project of the next cycle is not simply another MW of generation. It is a package: generation, grid access, storage, balancing logic, industrial offtake, carbon documentation and resilience under supply disruption.
