Serbia’s public debt stood at €39.35 billion at the end of March 2026, equivalent to 41.7% of GDP, according to the latest figures reported by Forbes Serbia and Beta. At the end of 2025, the debt stock was broadly similar in absolute terms, at around €39.3 billion, but represented a higher 44.4% of GDP. The difference underlines an important point in Serbia’s fiscal picture: the debt ratio has improved less because the nominal debt burden has materially fallen, and more because GDP has continued to expand in nominal terms.
On headline indicators, Serbia still appears to sit within a manageable debt range by European standards. A public debt ratio slightly above 40% of GDP is not, by itself, a sign of fiscal distress. But the structure of the debt tells a more nuanced story. The state is increasingly using a broad mix of domestic commercial banks, international financial institutions, foreign governments, export-credit lenders and international capital-market instruments to finance infrastructure, budget needs and strategic projects.
Around 66% of Serbia’s public debt was contracted at fixed interest rates as of March 2026, while 34% carried variable rates. That split is important because it defines Serbia’s exposure to interest-rate cycles. The fixed-rate portion gives the budget some protection against future market volatility. The variable-rate portion, however, remains sensitive to movements in benchmark rates and refinancing costs, especially if global monetary conditions stay tighter for longer or if Serbia’s sovereign risk premium widens.
Debt linked to long-term euro-denominated government securities also continued to rise. At the end of 2025, Serbia owed €1.79 billion, or around RSD 210 billion, on that basis. By the end of March 2026, the amount had increased to €1.84 billion, or RSD 216.9 billion. This is not a dramatic increase, but it shows the continuing role of euro-linked instruments in Serbia’s debt architecture. For a country with a stable exchange-rate policy and a high degree of euroisation in business and savings behaviour, euro debt can lower borrowing costs, but it also keeps currency exposure embedded in the public balance sheet.
The domestic creditor structure shows how strongly Serbia’s borrowing is tied to large infrastructure projects. Among domestic banks, Serbia has three loans from UniCredit Bank, all connected to financing the Ruma–Šabac–Loznica road corridor. The same bank is also financing line infrastructure connected with the National Stadium in Surčin. This places domestic commercial lending directly inside Serbia’s transport and EXPO-related investment cycle.
OTP Bank is another important domestic creditor. Serbia has borrowed from OTP for the reconstruction and modernisation of the Subotica–Horgoš railway line toward the Hungarian border and Szeged. Two additional OTP loans are linked to the fast road section Požarevac–Golubac, known as part of the Danube corridor, while another loan supports construction of the Kragujevac bypass. These are not isolated loans; they form part of the wider state-led infrastructure push intended to improve regional connectivity, logistics and urban access.
Banca Intesa in Serbia has four loans connected with the Ruma–Šabac–Loznica road project, while Poštanska štedionica has become involved in several state-backed infrastructure financings. Two of its loans relate to the National Stadium project, including line infrastructure and urban infrastructure with access roads. Poštanska štedionica is also financing roads and infrastructure at Makiško polje, as well as the tunnel connection between Karađorđeva Street and the Danube slope in Belgrade.
NLB Komercijalna banka is also among the domestic lenders. Its loans are linked to the Danube highway, the Kragujevac bypass, and the design and construction of the Belgrade–Zrenjanin–Novi Sad motorway. The pattern is clear: domestic banks are not merely funding short-term liquidity needs. They are financing named public infrastructure assets, many of which are politically visible, capital-intensive and tied to Serbia’s growth and urban-development agenda.
On the foreign side, Serbia’s creditor base remains diversified. The country has obligations to major international financial institutions, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and China’s Export-Import Bank. It also has borrowing arrangements with the Council of Europe Development Bank, KfW, the International Monetary Fund, and the Paris Club of creditors.
Serbia also continues to repay loans to foreign governments and development funds, including the Government of the Russian Federation, the Government of France, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, and the Saudi Fund for Development. Among foreign commercial banks, Serbia has obligations to institutions including JPMorgan Chase, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, and the Bank of China.
This creditor structure gives Serbia financing flexibility, but it also makes debt management more demanding. Borrowing from international financial institutions often comes with longer maturities, project discipline and policy conditionality. Borrowing from commercial banks can move faster but may carry different refinancing and pricing risks. Loans from foreign governments and export-credit institutions can support strategic infrastructure, but they may also create concentration risk if repayment profiles, procurement terms or geopolitical relationships shift.
The local-government debt picture is smaller but still relevant. At the end of 2025, local authorities had total debt of RSD 48 billion, or around €409 million. Of that amount, RSD 13.7 billion, or €117.2 million, was guaranteed by the Serbian state, while RSD 34.2 billion, or €291.9 million, was not guaranteed. Local-government debt increased by RSD 5 billion compared with 2024.
The City of Belgrade accounted for the largest share of local-government debt, with RSD 32.8 billion, or around €280 million, representing 68.5% of total local-authority borrowing. Novi Sad followed with RSD 5.7 billion, or €48.8 million, equal to 11.9% of the local-government debt stock. The debt of AP Vojvodina stood at RSD 1.3 billion, or around €11 million, representing 2.7% of the total.
The concentration of local debt in Belgrade reflects the capital’s role as Serbia’s largest infrastructure and real estate development centre. It also shows why national and local fiscal risks cannot be viewed separately. When major urban infrastructure projects are financed through local borrowing, guaranteed obligations or state-linked commercial lending, the boundary between municipal development finance and sovereign fiscal exposure becomes thinner.
Serbia’s debt profile therefore cannot be judged only by the debt-to-GDP ratio. The more important question is what kind of assets are being financed, whether those assets generate economic returns, and whether the borrowing terms remain manageable under less favourable interest-rate and growth conditions. Roads, railways, bypasses and urban infrastructure can support productivity if they reduce logistics costs, improve regional access and unlock private investment. But if projects are selected mainly for political visibility, the fiscal return weakens and debt service becomes a heavier burden on future budgets.
The current structure also raises a public-finance transparency issue. A growing number of project-specific loans across domestic banks, international institutions and foreign lenders requires clearer reporting on maturity profiles, interest costs, guarantees, procurement arrangements and expected economic benefits. Investors and citizens need to see not only how much Serbia owes, but also what the debt is buying and how the financed projects affect growth, tax revenues and long-term fiscal capacity.
For now, Serbia’s debt level remains inside a range that allows continued market access and infrastructure financing. But the margin of comfort depends on discipline. A debt stock of €39.35 billion is manageable only if nominal GDP continues to grow, borrowing costs remain contained, and public investment delivers measurable economic value. The composition of Serbia’s creditors shows a country still able to raise capital from many sources. It also shows a state increasingly reliant on project-linked borrowing to sustain its investment cycle, with domestic banks, foreign lenders and international institutions all tied into the same fiscal-development equation.
