Serbia’s external-position indicators show a country with a still comfortable external buffer, improving debt-service pressure and a stronger trade openness profile, but also a balance sheet that is becoming more exposed to import intensity, short-term external liabilities and the financing demands of a more open manufacturing economy. The latest National Bank of Serbia file, updated on 15 May 2026, covers annual data through 2025 and selected Q1 2026 indicators.
The headline is that Serbia entered 2026 with a solid external-liquidity position. Foreign-exchange reserves still covered 6.55 months of imports of goods and services in Q1 2026, compared with 6.71 months in 2025 and 7.28 months in 2024. The decline is not alarming, but it is directionally important. Serbia still has more than adequate reserve coverage, yet the ratio is being pulled lower by a combination of high import demand, external financing needs and a still sizeable trade and current-account gap.
In absolute terms, central-bank foreign-exchange reserves stood at EUR 29.0bn at the end of 2025, slightly below EUR 29.3bn in 2024. By Q1 2026, reserves had eased further to EUR 28.49bn. That is still a strong reserve stock for Serbia’s economy, but it shows that the external position is not improving through reserve accumulation. The economy is relying on a still-large reserve base while import demand and external financial flows remain active.
The solvency picture is relatively stable. Serbia’s GDP rose to EUR 88.67bn in 2025, from EUR 83.26bn in 2024, while external debt increased to EUR 51.09bn, from EUR 48.77bn. Because GDP grew faster than the debt ratio, external debt declined slightly as a share of GDP, from 58.58% in 2024 to 57.62% in 2025. This is a positive macro signal. Serbia is carrying more external debt in nominal euros, but the economy’s euro-denominated GDP base has expanded enough to keep the ratio under control.
The more important improvement is in debt servicing. External debt servicing fell from EUR 9.03bn in 2024 to EUR 7.90bn in 2025. As a share of GDP, debt repayment declined from 10.85% to 8.91%. As a share of exports of goods and services, it fell from 20.38% to 16.57%. This is one of the strongest indicators in the dataset. Serbia’s external debt burden is not disappearing, but the annual servicing pressure moderated in 2025, leaving more room for trade, investment and reserve management.
The concern is the short-term-debt line. Short-term external debt at original maturity almost doubled from EUR 974mn in 2024 to EUR 1.94bn in 2025. As a share of GDP, it rose from 8.53% to 10.70%. Foreign-exchange reserves still covered short-term debt by 305.8% in 2025, which is a strong liquidity buffer, but the deterioration from 414.1% in 2024 is significant. The risk is not immediate liquidity stress. The risk is that Serbia’s external position is becoming more dependent on rolling short-term financing while trade openness and import needs are rising.
The current-account position remains the clearest structural weakness. The current-account deficit widened to EUR 4.30bn in 2025, from EUR 3.79bn in 2024, equal to about 4.85% of GDP. The Q1 2026 deficit was much smaller, at EUR 179mn, but a single quarter should not be overread. The annual trend still shows that Serbia’s growth model is import-intensive. That is consistent with the trade data showing strong imports of machinery, metals, components, energy inputs and intermediate goods for manufacturing and construction.
The openness indicator confirms how deeply Serbia is now integrated into external trade. The ratio of exports plus imports of goods and services to GDP rose to 112.25% in 2025, from 111.20% in 2024, and reached 117.06% in Q1 2026. This is one of the most important strategic indicators. Serbia is no longer a relatively closed domestic-demand economy. It is a highly open economy whose growth, financing and industrial development are increasingly tied to cross-border trade, supply chains, EU demand and import availability.
For the nearshoring thesis, this is supportive but conditional. A high openness ratio means Serbia is well placed to act as a production and fabrication platform for EU markets. Imported steel, aluminium, copper, machinery, plastics, vehicle parts and electrical components can be transformed into higher-value exports. But openness also increases vulnerability. If imports rise faster than exports, the current account weakens. If external financing tightens, short-term debt becomes more sensitive. If EU demand slows, Serbia’s export engine is exposed.
The reserve ratios suggest that Serbia still has time and room to manage this transition. Foreign-exchange reserves were equal to 32.71% of GDP in 2025, down from 35.19% in 2024, but still high. Reserves were equal to around 56.8% of total external debt, which is a comfortable but not excessive cushion. Reserves also covered reserve money by about 200% in 2025 and Q1 2026, showing monetary backing remains strong. The reserve-to-M1 ratio improved from 156.1%in 2025 to 161.7% in Q1 2026, which supports confidence in the domestic liquidity position.
The rating indicators add another layer. Serbia reached BBB- / stable with S&P in 2024, marking the move into investment-grade territory, while Moody’s held Serbia at Ba2 / stable in 2026 after a positive outlook in 2024. The broader message is that markets recognise Serbia’s macro stability, but the external position still needs disciplined management. Investment grade helps funding access, but it does not remove sensitivity to eurobond yields, foreign-currency debt, current-account financing and reserve adequacy.
For banks and industrial investors, the message is direct. Serbia has the external liquidity to support an import-intensive manufacturing cycle, but not enough room to treat the trade deficit as irrelevant. Projects that convert imported inputs into exportable products are macro-positive. Projects that only add import demand without export earnings increase external pressure. This distinction matters for metals, aluminium, machinery, vehicle parts, electrical conductors and CBAM-related industrial investment.
The best nearshoring projects will therefore be those that strengthen the external position rather than weaken it. A factory importing aluminium, copper or steel and exporting finished components to Germany, Italy or Hungary improves Serbia’s trade quality if margins are strong and export receipts are reliable. A project importing equipment and materials but selling only into a small domestic market adds to external vulnerability unless it raises productivity or replaces imports. In that sense, the external-position data create a bankability test: does the project generate foreign-currency earnings, reduce import dependence, or build a stronger export chain?
CBAM and carbon documentation make this more important. Serbia’s industrial exporters will need imported inputs, but they will also need traceability, product-level emissions data and electricity-origin evidence. If the country can combine strong external reserves with export-oriented fabrication and carbon-ready documentation, nearshoring becomes a way to improve external sustainability. If imported inputs are not converted into competitive EU-facing products, the same openness becomes a source of current-account pressure.
The short-term forecast is therefore balanced. Serbia’s external liquidity is still strong, with reserves covering more than six months of imports and more than three times short-term debt. Debt-service pressure improved materially in 2025. External debt is high but stable as a share of GDP. The risks are concentrated in the widening current-account deficit, the rise in short-term debt, and the gradual decline in reserve-import coverage from the 2024 peak.
The strategic conclusion is that Serbia has the external balance-sheet space to finance a new export cycle, but that space must be used carefully. The country’s best path is not lower imports at any cost; its economy needs imported materials, equipment and components. The stronger path is to raise the export yield of those imports. Imported metals, machinery and industrial inputs need to become higher-value exports, not just domestic consumption or low-margin assembly.
Serbia’s external position is therefore not a constraint on nearshoring today. It is a warning against weak nearshoring. The macro indicators support industrial expansion when it generates export receipts, improves productivity and reduces carbon-related EU market risk. They are less forgiving toward projects that deepen import dependence without raising foreign-currency earnings. As the economy becomes more open, the next phase of Serbia’s growth will depend on whether its banks, exporters and industrial investors can turn external exposure into export capacity.
