Serbia’s planned National Stadium will not be completed in time for Expo 2027 after permitting delays slowed construction, while government accounts show that only a fraction of the money budgeted for the project was spent last year.
The stadium, being built in Belgrade’s Surčin district as part of a wider investment programme around the Expo site, is now expected to be completed in early 2028, moving delivery beyond the international exhibition scheduled for 2027.
Serbia spent about RSD 2.5 billion, or roughly €21.5 million, on the stadium during 2025, compared with an adjusted budget allocation of around RSD 18.5 billion, according to government budget execution data.
That represents execution of only about 13.6% of the planned annual amount.
The final budget account attributed the shortfall primarily to additional permitting requirements affecting Lot 2, which delayed the start of works.
The contractor for that part of the project is Power Construction Corporation of China, or PowerChina.
The delay is significant because the stadium has been developed alongside the wider Expo 2027 construction programme, which includes exhibition facilities, transport connections, utilities, housing and other infrastructure in western Belgrade.
Missing the Expo timetable does not prevent the stadium from being completed or used later, but it changes the immediate economic case surrounding its construction.
Infrastructure projects associated with major international events are typically justified partly by their ability to support visitor flows, global visibility and activity during the event itself.
A stadium completed after Expo will no longer contribute to that timetable.
More importantly, the low 2025 spending rate provides a measurable indication of project execution risk at a time when Serbia is simultaneously pursuing an unusually large portfolio of public investment.
The government is financing motorways, railways, energy facilities, the Belgrade Metro, Expo-related infrastructure and other capital projects.
The constraint may therefore be increasingly less about identifying or allocating capital and more about turning budget appropriations into completed projects within the planned schedule.
Permits, land preparation, utility relocation, contractor mobilisation and coordination between packages can delay spending even when funds have already been approved.
The stadium illustrates that distinction.
An underspent capital budget does not necessarily mean the final project will cost more, and delayed expenditure can simply move into subsequent fiscal years.
But timetable slippage can create secondary costs.
Contractors may face longer mobilisation periods, procurement prices can change, and construction activity that was originally spread across several years can become concentrated into a shorter period.
For Serbia, that issue matters particularly because several of its biggest projects are expected to peak around the same time.
The wider Expo programme is also likely to be judged increasingly on physical delivery rather than announced investment values as 2027 approaches.
The stadium is one of the most visible projects in that portfolio.
Its revised timetable therefore provides a useful test of Serbia’s ability to manage a large number of complex infrastructure contracts simultaneously.
The central question is no longer whether financing has been allocated.
It is whether the state, contractors and permitting authorities can convert that financing into completed assets fast enough to meet the deadlines around which the investment programme was originally designed.
