Serbia’s renewed interest in nuclear energy is still at an early, exploratory stage. Yet even before questions of technology, financing or site selection come into focus, a more immediate constraint is beginning to surface—one rooted not in engineering, but in law.
As discussions gather pace around the country’s long-term energy mix, experts involved in preliminary assessments are pointing to a shortage of specialists in nuclear law as one of the first gaps that needs to be addressed. The sequencing is notable. In most infrastructure sectors, legal frameworks follow investment decisions. In nuclear energy, they come first.
This reflects the nature of the industry itself. Nuclear power is governed by a dense and highly codified system of international obligations, ranging from safety standards and environmental safeguards to liability regimes and non-proliferation commitments. These are not secondary considerations. They are the foundation on which any programme must be built.
For Serbia, that foundation remains incomplete. While the country has begun exploring nuclear options—supported in part by preliminary studies and cooperation with international partners—the legal and institutional architecture required to support a civilian nuclear programme has yet to be fully developed.
Establishing that framework is not a procedural exercise. It involves aligning national legislation with international conventions, defining the authority and independence of regulatory bodies, and setting out clear rules on licensing, oversight and accountability. Without this, neither investors nor technology providers are likely to engage.
The emphasis on legal expertise also points to a broader human capital challenge. Serbia, like most countries without an existing nuclear sector, lacks a deep pool of specialists across multiple disciplines. Building that capacity—lawyers, regulators, engineers and safety experts—typically takes years, if not decades.
In that context, the focus on nuclear law is less surprising. It is the entry point into a much wider process of institution-building. Legal frameworks define not only how projects are approved, but how risks are managed, how responsibilities are allocated and how cross-border implications are handled.
The timing of this debate is linked to wider shifts in Serbia’s energy strategy. With coal capacity gradually ageing, hydropower largely developed and gas imports exposed to geopolitical volatility, nuclear energy is being reconsidered as a potential source of stable, low-carbon baseload in the longer term.
That does not imply an imminent construction decision. On the contrary, the current phase is about assessing feasibility and preparing the groundwork. Experience from other countries suggests that the preparatory stage alone can span a decade, particularly for states building a nuclear programme from scratch.
International cooperation is already playing a role. Engagement with partners such as France’s EDF is extending beyond technical assessments to include support in areas such as regulatory design and workforce development. This underlines the extent to which nuclear projects are as much institutional as they are industrial.
What is emerging is a clearer picture of the pathway ahead. Before reactors, before financing structures, even before site selection, comes the less visible but more complex task of building a system capable of governing nuclear activity.
For Serbia, that process is only just beginning. The identification of a shortage in nuclear legal expertise is not a marginal detail. It is an early indication of the scale of preparation required—and a reminder that in nuclear energy, the hardest work often happens long before construction starts.
