The Western Balkans are becoming a new battleground between energy-security policy and EU decarbonisation, as governments seek more U.S. liquefied natural gas to replace Russian supply while Brussels questions whether the region should be building new gas dependence at all.
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and North Macedonia are pursuing or considering infrastructure that would increase access to U.S. LNG through Greece and Croatia, arguing that gas is needed as a transition fuel while coal is phased down and renewable generation expands.
EU officials are increasingly sceptical.
The concern is not primarily about replacing Russian gas with American supply. It is that new pipelines, terminals and gas-fired generation could increase the region’s overall gas consumption just as candidate countries are expected to align with the EU’s long-term climate targets.
That creates a strategic contradiction.
Western Balkan governments are trying to reduce dependence on a dominant Russian supply route at the same time as the EU is moving toward lower fossil-fuel consumption altogether.
Serbia sits at the centre of the dilemma
The issue is particularly relevant for Serbia.
Belgrade already has an interconnector with Bulgaria, allowing access to Azerbaijani gas and potentially LNG imported through Greece, and is preparing another connection toward North Macedonia.
The government is also expanding its internal gas network and advancing a World Bank-backed infrastructure programme centred on the Trupale–Pojate pipeline, intended to move additional southern gas flows deeper into the domestic system.
For Serbia, diversification has an obvious security logic.
The country remains heavily dependent on Russian gas and is trying to create alternative routes before future supply arrangements become more uncertain.
U.S. LNG delivered through Greek terminals could become one part of that portfolio.
But the commercial question is whether those new routes merely replace Russian molecules or create incentives for Serbia to consume substantially more gas.
That distinction is likely to become increasingly important for EU institutions and international lenders.
EU warns against creating new gas markets
European officials have warned against introducing gas into markets where demand is currently limited.
The concern is particularly relevant for countries such as Albania, where gas currently plays only a marginal role in the energy mix.
Building new pipelines can create a powerful economic incentive to use them for decades.
Once governments and lenders commit hundreds of millions of euros to transmission infrastructure, power plants and import facilities, low utilisation becomes politically and financially difficult.
Infrastructure built to improve short-term energy security can therefore create pressure to preserve gas demand long after the original supply-security problem has changed.
The U.S. sees a commercial opening
Washington sees the same market differently.
The United States has become one of the world’s largest LNG suppliers and is looking for additional long-term markets as Europe reduces Russian gas imports.
The Western Balkans offer an obvious opportunity.
The region still depends heavily on coal, while several countries remain exposed to Russian gas routes or have limited supply diversification.
U.S. officials argue that LNG can improve regional energy security, reduce dependence on Russia and support trade and economic development.
Albania has moved toward long-term U.S. LNG supply, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is pursuing its southern gas connection toward Croatia and access to the Krk LNG terminal.
Serbia and North Macedonia are also developing routes that would improve access to LNG entering southeast Europe through Greece.
That creates a new commercial map in which Alexandroupolis, Revithoussa and Krk could increasingly compete with traditional Russian pipeline routes for Balkan demand.
Gas as a bridge from coal
Regional governments argue that the transition cannot rely on renewables alone.
The Western Balkans still depend heavily on coal for electricity generation, while drought can make hydropower less predictable.
Solar and wind can replace part of coal production, but they are variable.
Gas-fired power plants can start relatively quickly and provide electricity when renewable output is low.
That makes gas attractive as a transition fuel.
For Serbia, the argument is particularly relevant because the country is planning substantial additions of wind and solar capacity while remaining heavily dependent on lignite.
New gas-fired capacity could provide flexibility during the transition.
But gas is only one option.
Battery storage, pumped-storage hydropower, stronger interconnections and demand-side flexibility can perform overlapping functions. Serbia is already pursuing investments across several of these areas.
The investment decision is therefore increasingly about which combination delivers reliability at the lowest long-term cost.
Infrastructure economics are the real issue
The argument between Brussels and regional governments can sometimes appear political, but the underlying question is fundamentally financial.
A new pipeline or gas-fired plant requires long-term utilisation to justify its cost.
If EU climate policy causes gas consumption to fall faster than expected, utilisation can decline and infrastructure risks becoming economically stranded.
If the region instead reduces coal more slowly and renewable integration proves difficult, insufficient flexible generation and gas infrastructure could leave countries exposed to power shortages or expensive electricity imports.
Both risks need to be priced into investment decisions.
That is why the design and scale of new projects matter more than whether gas is labelled simply as beneficial or problematic.
A pipeline that allows several suppliers to compete for existing demand has a different economic profile from one whose viability depends on substantially increasing national gas consumption.
For Serbia, this distinction should become central to future investment decisions.
Bosnia becomes an important test case
The dispute is particularly visible in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The proposed Southern Interconnection would allow Bosnia to import gas from Croatia and potentially LNG through Krk, reducing dependence on its existing Russian supply route.
The project has also generated debate over its operating model and the role of different companies.
EU and Energy Community officials have emphasised that new infrastructure should follow principles of competition, transparency and equal market access rather than creating privileged positions for individual suppliers or operators.
That issue is relevant across the region.
The EU does not decide whether Western Balkan countries can purchase U.S. gas.
But accession candidates are expected to progressively align market structures, competition rules and decarbonisation policies with the bloc.
The more strategically important gas infrastructure becomes, the more closely its commercial structure is likely to be scrutinised.
Europe itself still depends on U.S. LNG
There is also a tension within the European position.
Europe dramatically increased purchases of U.S. LNG after Russian pipeline deliveries declined.
The EU produces relatively little domestic gas and continues to depend heavily on imports.
Western Balkan governments can therefore question why LNG infrastructure should be acceptable for EU member states while new gas investments in candidate countries attract greater scrutiny.
The distinction is increasingly about scale, utilisation and duration.
Europe sees much of its LNG infrastructure as providing supply security during a transition toward lower gas consumption.
The concern is that Western Balkan countries could create substantial new gas demand just as the EU itself begins reducing it.
That makes investment timing and assumptions about future consumption critical.
Serbia needs optionality, not dependence
For Serbia, the strongest commercial objective is not choosing between Russian gas and U.S. LNG.
It is creating enough infrastructure and market competition to avoid excessive dependence on either.
Russian pipeline gas, Azerbaijani supply, LNG through Greece, storage and regional interconnections should ultimately compete within the same system.
If alternative routes merely replace one dominant supplier with another, diversification achieves relatively little.
The objective is optionality.
Serbia needs the ability to source gas according to price, availability and security without making the economy dependent on permanently rising gas consumption.
That is the wider market test facing the Western Balkans.
U.S. LNG can reduce dependence on Russia. But the region’s longer-term advantage will depend on whether new infrastructure increases competition and security without creating another form of structural dependence.
