Faced with the daunting challenge of the coronavirus crisis, the Serbian government has solicited Chinese assistance in very public fashion to help combat the pandemic. For the authorities in Belgrade, COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus, has the potential to pose an even greater challenge than in other countries. Serbia has one of the oldest populations in the world, and hundreds of thousands of its citizens live and work in the European countries hit hardest by the pandemic. Over 400,000 Serbians have already returned to Serbia from these European countries, many of them undoubtedly carrying the coronavirus.
The Serbian government quickly hit the panic button. Since its European and American partners were facing the same difficulties at precisely the same time, they were not in a position to provide Serbia with the tangible and immediate assistance it required. But China was. And in response to Serbia’s request, China has indeed sent much-needed medical equipment, including ventilators, masks, and other supplies, as well as a team of medical experts from Wuhan, where the new coronavirus first appeared.
Belgrade’s public appeal to Beijing for COVID-19 support and the consequences of its gratitude, however, should not be exaggerated. The cooperative relationship between Serbia and China in recent years is at least partially an outgrowth of the Kosovo dispute. Belgrade appreciates and seeks to expand relations with virtually all countries that have not recognized Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. China is one of these countries, and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council Beijing wields considerable influence by ensuring that Kosovo is not granted a seat at the UN until Belgrade is able to reach a compromise settlement with Pristina.
Much like Italy, Austria, and every EU and NATO member state to their east, Serbia is part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While the Chinese are economically active in Serbia, their investments are, in reality, mostly loans and remain clustered around several specific projects. Of the $2.2 billion that has entered Serbia from China, almost two-thirds are loans and only one-fourth, or $561 million, actual investments. Compare this to Chinese investments in the U.K., which were $8.3 billion in 2019 alone. Approximately 65 percent of Serbia’s overall trade is with the EU, and the non-EU countries of the western Balkans represent a significant portion of the remainder. Serbia’s trade with China is, for example, only a bit larger than its trade with Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has a population of 3.3 million.
The United States and NATO member states are the largest financial donors to the Serbian armed forces. While this is not widely known, the United States is Serbia’s closest security partner, and China is neither able nor inclined to replace it. Rather than Chinese arms purchases, President Aleksandar Vucic, during a recent visit to Washington, announced that Serbia would be buying weapons from the United States and one of America’s closest allies, Israel. In addition, Serbia recently adopted the second cycle of its Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO, which puts the country’s military cooperation with NATO on a level that far exceeds its military engagement with China.
The EU should counter Chinese economic activities in Serbia and the broader region by facilitating access to its infrastructure funds for EU candidate countries like Serbia. Brussels must develop a common EU policy and set of requirements for Chinese investments, especially related to technology and telecommunications, allowing Serbia and other EU candidates to be accurately assessed for compliance. It should also remove steel and other quotas that are in place for these countries, treating them like the future members they are.
For its part, Serbia must still tread carefully in its relations with China. This is especially true when it comes to the use of Chinese technology and telecommunications equipment in defense and security systems and public administration. Serbia should not deploy Chinese technology in a way that could undermine civil liberties or provide China access to its security infrastructure, which would create challenges for Serbia on its path to the EU. Beijing can help Serbia maintain leverage in its negotiations to find a mutually acceptable solution over Kosovo, but it cannot play an active role in resolving this dispute, which Vucic is striving to do. The solution to Kosovo lies in Europe and the United States. Belgrade understands this well. Serbia is not seeking to replace the West as its principal partner and, despite the current rhetoric and public expressions of gratitude, no amount of Chinese aid to fight coronavirus is going to change that.
