What certainly remains as an important challenge for our society is how to revive a culture of responsible dialogue on all significant issues, including the economic, ecological, and broader significance of lithium and borates for Serbia. Perhaps the experience of European countries such as France could assist us in this.
This January marks two years since the Serbian government officially revoked the special-purpose spatial plan, thus halting the Jadar project. In November 2023, this company, refuting claims by the Ecological Uprising that it had participated in signing the Letter of Intent between the EU and Serbia regarding lithium, reminded that they still ‘believe in the Jadar project.’ They asserted that jadarite can be exploited in a safe and responsible manner, as they stated.
In his Christmas appearance on Pink TV, the President of Serbia emphasized that ‘we must consider what to do with lithium’ and suggested that the conflict in eastern Ukraine is partly fueled by this issue, while we ‘pretend we don’t have it.’
It seems that the possibility of a responsible dialogue on lithium in Serbia is further complicated by the post-election atmosphere, and this issue is not currently high on the list of priorities. In contrast to Serbia, discussions about lithium extraction and processing, battery production, and electric vehicles are gaining serious attention in Europe. Currently, 21 lithium mining and processing projects are in various stages of development, planning, and implementation in Europe. This is likely the only way to achieve sustainable political goals in green transition in democratic societies.
Accelerating the dialogue on lithium in Europe – the example of France
The second-largest economy in Europe is set to initiate a significant social dialogue this spring regarding its lithium future. France has already made significant strides in the field of electromobility and mass production of lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles. The focus of the discussions, under the auspices of the State Commission for Public Debate, will primarily be on the economic benefits and social and environmental challenges of the underground lithium mining project – the Emile project.
The multinational company Imeris, founded in 1880 and based in Paris, claims that its project is one of the largest lithium initiatives in Europe and is expected to commence production in 2028. The plan is to produce 34,000 tons of lithium hydroxide, sufficient for 700,000 electric vehicles. Earlier, French President Macron announced the ambition for his country to produce up to two million such vehicles by 2030. Additionally, the company, on the other side of the Channel, is involved in a joint venture with British Lithium since the opening of the underground lithium mine in the Cornwall region of the United Kingdom.
Similar to some other EU countries, France has made significant progress in the field of downstream investments in electromobility. In May of last year, the first gigafactory for batteries was grandly opened in the northern part of the country. This endeavor by ACC (Automotive Cells Company), a joint venture involving Stellantis, Mercedes-Benz Group, Saft, and Total Energies Group, involves the construction and operation of three more similar factories in Europe.
Another major French battery production project, extensively covered in both European media and President Macron’s tweets, is the Verkor project worth two billion euros, which received support of around 700 million euros from French taxpayers. Lithium, in addition to all of this, is also becoming a significant element of French diplomacy. Last year, France entered into a strategic partnership agreement with Mongolia regarding the supply of uranium and lithium, following a global trend initiated by the United States and China, and later joined by the EU. However, this global competition is evidently becoming more complex.
German lithium batteries vs. others
Discussions on lithium, particularly on the effects of mining projects and possibilities for building the electric mobility production chain, will be taken seriously in other European countries as well. In 2024, we will also find out which European country will be the first to enter mass production of lithium necessary for supplying battery systems for electric vehicles. According to companies leading mining projects, Finland and Germany are currently competing for the top spot.
The Finnish project Keliber Oy has all the necessary permits to open the mine and aims to be the first in Europe. The ore processing facility will be located in the Kokkola industrial park, spanning over 700 hectares, approximately five kilometers from the city center.
On the other hand, Germany has lithium deposits in underground geothermal waters, and according to Vulcan Energy Resources, the company plans to start successful production by 2025. Similar to France, Germany recently allocated 700 million euros in support of the 4.5-billion-euro investment by the Swedish company Northvolt for the construction of a gigafactory for lithium batteries.
Arguably the most important news for the electromobility sector since the beginning of this year is the European Commission’s green light for such substantial state aid from Germany, along with the explanation that it is a strategic project that might otherwise go elsewhere—specifically to the United States due to the generous budgetary support from the Biden administration for this sector.
According to Bloomberg estimates, Germany is expected to remain the largest battery producer in Europe in the coming years. By 2027, Hungary will hold the second position, followed by Sweden and Poland.
Debates have already started in the Czech Republic regarding one of the largest lithium projects in Europe – Cinovec. This underground mine on the border with Germany, along with the ore processing facility, has received financial support from the EU as a project of strategic importance. Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala elevated the lithium issue to a strategic level for the future of the country, stating last year that lithium is one of the pillars of the future development of his nation.
Lithium vulnerability of the old continent and Serbia’s position
According to the European Commission’s estimates, the European Union will face a twelvefold increase in the shortage of lithium by the year 2030 compared to 2020. This is just one of the so-called strategic critical raw materials that the EU is concerned about.
This is not solely about the vulnerability in the production of computers, smartphones, solar panels, and electric vehicles, all of which contain lithium-ion batteries. A part of this complex geopolitical, economic, and societal puzzle is the EU’s decision to stop producing cars with internal combustion engines from 2035. According to Battery News, a portal that tracks battery production through its Battery Atlas, more than fifty gigafactories for lithium-ion battery production will open on our continent by 2030. On this map, Serbia is included with the ElevenEs lithium battery factory in Subotica, which is already operational, and the planned Inobat factory in Ćuprija, Slovakia.
In December, the European Commission announced the formation of a special segment of the Innovation Fund with three billion euros to support the construction and strengthening of the electric vehicle battery production chain. This should be considered in the context of the massive subsidies that companies in this sector receive from member states.
It is, therefore, a broader strategic political orientation towards green energy transition. This must encompass both a high level of security and resilience in supply chains, and according to some, a radical increase in Europe’s own production and processing capacities. If the disruption of global supply chains, as a consequence of the COVID crisis, seriously shook Europe, the energy crisis following Russia’s aggression in Ukraine permanently jolted Europe from a kind of strategic slumber. Ambitious political goals for a significant increase in the share of renewable energy in the member states’ energy mix and a shift towards electromobility have been seriously questioned.
A justified question arose whether Europe would become dependent on China and third countries for the supply of the raw materials necessary for the green transition, much like it was dependent on Russia for energy.
This comparison, often mentioned, makes sense only to some extent. The situation with critical raw materials is much more complex. The European Commission has compiled a list of 35 critical raw materials. The term ‘critical’ is used because these are materials possessed by a small number of countries in significant quantities, the process of obtaining and processing them is demanding, and either there is no alternative or their replacement with some other material is complicated. Europe has realized that it needs to increase both production and processing, as well as recycling wherever possible, in an environmentally acceptable and socially sustainable manner to alleviate its evidently subordinate position in this regard. One of the most significant responses of the EU to these challenges is the adoption of the Critical Raw Material Act, which was finally aligned at the end of last year, 2023.
This overarching law primarily stipulates that by 2030, the EU must annually extract 10%, process 40%, and recycle 15% of the mentioned strategic raw materials. Since the EU cannot achieve secure and diversified supply chains for strategic raw materials on its own, this law also establishes the formation of the ‘Critical Raw Material Club,’ a kind of partnership with third countries possessing significant production or processing capacities. The EU signs special strategic documents with these countries. The EU has already signed Memoranda of Understanding for strategic partnerships with Canada and Ukraine in 2021; with Namibia and Kazakhstan in 2022, and in the past year, 2023, with Chile, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Is there a strategy on lithium and borates, or is the president the only one with a ‘vision’
All of this is significant for our domestic context, considering that in September 2023, the Serbian government signed the mentioned Letter of Intent with the European Commission to start working towards a mutually agreed strategic partnership in the field of critical raw materials and batteries. The exact way in which the EU would be connected with lithium in Serbia remains unclear as the signing of the letter in New York went under the radar.
It is apparent that the only official in Serbia openly discussing lithium is the President of Serbia. It remains unclear why the Serbian government is reserved on this issue.
Of significance is also that the Ministry of Mining and Energy has announced a tender for the development of a strategy for managing Serbia’s mineral and other resources, along with an action plan to implement this strategy. The deadline for tender applications, as published on the public procurement portal, is January 30, 2024.
Can we expect this topic to resurface in the broader public discussion in the new year of 2024? Over the past two years, the issue of borates has also remained off the radar. On the website of Rio Sava Exploration, a company that continues to operate in Serbia even after the withdrawal of the spatial plan, it is stated that Serbia, through the Jadar project, would produce 285,000 tons of boric acid. Considering that the EU imports nearly 100% of its boron acid needs from Turkey, which is widely used in various industries, Serbia could potentially become the second-largest exporter of boric acid to the EU.
Western Balkans, economic growth, and Critical Raw Materials – what are the intentions of the European Union?
The connection with the EU became somewhat clearer after the release of the new growth plan for the Western Balkans, which the European Commission published at the end of last year. This plan, among other things, implies a clear orientation towards building and strengthening a strategic partnership in the field of critical raw materials, which, in the case of Serbia, almost certainly relates to lithium and likely copper, although it is not explicitly stated. This will primarily be achieved by identifying projects of mutual interest that the EU would support with significant financial resources, while adhering to strict standards in implementing these projects.
Whether the Jadar project will gain new life through this type of EU support remains to be seen. Lithium and borates are at the center of the green transition plans in the European Union. The Serbian government and president have not commented on this issue since the summit in Tirana and the announcement of the growth plan. Whether the ongoing election campaign is the reason for this or if the government is only now formulating a strategy will become clear over time.
It is evident that there is no serious social and political dialogue on key strategic issues in Serbia. While opponents of the exploitation project argue that the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) had already discussed this topic and closed it, the SANU meeting actually indicated that not enough is known about lithium and the Jadar project. Citizens of Serbia have been deprived of what is normal in any democratic society, which is the presentation of environmental impact assessments and dialogue through public discussion and presentation of impact assessment studies. This should typically, and according to the law, be led by the Ministry of Environmental Protection.
The media discourse and a serious lack of parliamentary debate hinder the initiation of discussions on strategic economic and geopolitical issues. If the Jadar project has the capacity to be the largest lithium and borate exploitation project in Europe, why hasn’t the Serbian government spoken on this matter even once, despite the fact that Rio Sava Exploration is still operating in Serbia and has announced that it still believes in its project? What remains as a significant challenge for our society is how to renew a culture of responsible dialogue on all important issues, including the economic, ecological, and broader significance of lithium and borates for Serbia. Perhaps the experience of European countries, such as France, could help us in this regard. However, considering that decisions about social dialogue are guided by electoral processes, it seems that we should only follow the president of the country, as ministers in the government do not express their views on this issue. Unless they are given permission to do so.
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